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Patent Policy Adrift in a Sea of Anecdote: A Reply
to Lichtman
MICHAEL J. MEURER* AND CRAIG ALLEN NARD**

We enjoyed reading and thinking about Doug Lichtman's response' to our
article on the doctrine of equivalents (DOE), 2 especially his eloquent formulation of the essential policy issues. Apparently, the three of us share roughly the
same approach to economic analysis of the DOE. Nevertheless, Lichtman fears
we have overestimated the skill of patent attorneys and lost track of the crucial
role the DOE plays in augmenting patent scope and bolstering incentives to
invent. We write this reply to highlight two largely empirical questions that we
disagree about, and explain how these disagreements lead us to very different
policy conclusions.
Lichtman contends that the DOE is "first and foremost a doctrine about
patent scope," and that we are wrong to rely so heavily on institutional
considerations when formulating our policy recommendations. 3 True, we are
more concerned than he about the administrative costs of the DOE, but claim
scope is never far from sight, and is always in play in our analysis. 4 Naturally,
we think that we have struck the right balance between institutional and scope
concerns, and do not understand why incentives should be the "dominant
consideration" 5 in DOE policy analysis.
Whether scope should drive DOE policy depends on the answers to empirical
questions about the incentive effect of the doctrine. Unfortunately, there is no
solid evidence assessing the effect of the DOE on expected profit to patent
owners. 6 We argue that claim refinement can achieve much the same scope that
patent owners obtain through the DOE. We argue that restriction of the DOE
does not greatly increase the cost of refinement. Lichtman disagrees on both
points. Resolution of these disputes calls for hard data rather than the anecdotes
* Professor of Law, Michaels Faculty Scholar, and Director, Institute for Business, Law and
Technology, Boston University School of Law; meurer@bu.edu. © 2005, Michael J. Meurer and Craig
Allen Nard.
** Tom J.E. and Bette Lou Walker Professor of Law, and Director, Center for Law, Technology &
the Arts, Case School of Law, Case Western Reserve University; craig.nard@case.edu.
1. Doug Lichtman, Substitutesfor the Doctrine of Equivalents:A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93

GEO. L.J. 2013 (2005) [hereinafter "Substitutes"].
2. Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005) [hereinafter "Refinement"].
3. Substitutes,supra note 1, at 2014.

4. For example, Propositions 2 and 6 attend to scope and incentive effects in the context of pioneer
inventions and later-developed technology.
5. Substitutes,supra note 1, at 2025.

6. Stock market event studies are one way to generate such evidence. In theory, one could trace the
impact of landmark DOE cases on the value of stocks of patent owners. For an effort along these lines,
see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Direct and Indirect Stock Price Reactions to Patent Decisions, available at

http://www.bu.edu/law/news/ip/papers/PatentEvent.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
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that both sides rely on. We do, however, have evidence that, overall, patent
protection plays a relatively modest incentive role in most industries. 7 Furthermore, our (also anecdotal) impression from the case law is that the DOE is used
not so much by pioneers or other important inventors, but mainly by minor
inventors who would not have received a patent if the obviousness standard
were more rigorously applied.
We support limited use of the DOE, notably for pioneer inventors who are
likely to face high refinement costs. We think this policy choice mitigates most
of the possible harm to incentives. At the same time, we believe that restricting
the DOE plays a positive incentive role when it comes to follow-on innovators.
We are surprised that Lichtman pays scant attention to the incentives faced by
those seeking to improve patented technology.8 Our refinement theory balances
refinement cost savings and innovative incentives created by the DOE against
the harm to competition and rent-seeking costs created by the doctrine. As
Suzanne Scotchmer writes, "the challenge is to reward early innovators fully for
the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward later
innovators adequately for their improvements and new products as well." 9 We
believe that the refinement theory meets this challenge.°
Our second basic disagreement with Lichtman relates to his preference to
simply let the patent applicant control the choice between claim refinement and
reliance on the DOE. Instead, we prefer the Federal Circuit's approach that
screens cases and filters out the doctrine in certain circumstances. Lichtman's
approach is appealing because the applicant has an incentive to minimize the
cost of securing its patent rights and the best information about the cost of
refinement. Reliance on the applicant's choice makes policy sense when the
applicant's objectives are closely aligned with social objectives. We object to
this approach because we believe, as an empirical matter, that private and social
objectives often are misaligned.
We suspect that applicants often fail to fully refine their claim language
because the DOE acts as a backstop that allows them to behave strategically
vis-a-vis the examiner or their competitors. 1" There is some empirical evidence
that firms engage in strategic patent prosecution. For example, firms appear to
7. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on
PatentLitigation, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 1,6-7 (2005); see generally Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R.
Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: AppropriabilityConditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Finns Patent (or Not) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552,
2000).
8. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839, 857-59, 909-10 (1990) (explaining when the DOE should be restricted to reward
improvement innovation).
9. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J.EcoN. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991).
10. We do not consider all the issues required to fully analyze the allocation of patent rewards
between early and later inventors. But our model adds a new perspective to the analysis of this issue in
the context of the doctrine of equivalents.
11. Id. at 1974.
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extend prosecution through continuation practice when a patent is likely to be
subject to litigation.' 2 Furthermore, the number of claims and number of
citations included in patents are correlated with firm size and the number of
patents held by a firm.13 This admittedly indirect evidence shows that patent
prosecution is not entirely guided by the nature of the invention-prosecution is
guided by market conditions as well. Thus, if applicants follow prosecution
strategies guided by considerations other than cost minimization, we worry that
their decision to rely on the DOE will cause social harm.
Importantly, minimization of the cost of securing patent rights is not the
whole story. Because of the notice function of patent claims, optimal patent
policy sometimes requires applicants to engage in costly refinement even
though reliance on the DOE might be cheaper. 14 Lichtman makes good arguments that the notice theory is unimportant. 15 Once again, he does not challenge
the soundness of the theory, but casts doubt on its empirical significance.
Lacking data to quantify the magnitude of notice costs, we take comfort in the
intuition of patent judges and the standard view in law and economics that fuzzy
property rights frustrate investment decisions and impede transactions. 16 Independently, constraints on the DOE are valuable because they make summary
judgment of non-infringement more likely. This is especially important for
alleged infringers who face opportunistic or anti-competitive patent suits. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant reduces the defendant's litigation cost
and the size of the threat posed by bad patent lawsuits. 17 Finally, we offer
specific rebuttal to the two arguments we believe are the strongest. First,
Lichtman argues that firms do not read patents, and thus better claim refinement
will not affect notice costs. Plenty of anecdotes support his view, but the limited
evidence indicates that many firms do read patents.1 8 Second, he argues that the

12. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92
GEO. L.J. 435, 457-59 (2004).
13. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 21.
14. Recall that we identify three social costs created by fuzzy patent scope: "opportunistic and
anti-competitive patent suits; licensing problems; and inadvertent infringement." Refinement, supra
note 2, at 1984 n.190.
15. Substitutes, supra note 1, at 2021-24.
16. See Refinement, supra note 2, at 1954 n.30; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 100 (1988).

17. Empirical evidence suggests that patent litigation imposes a growing tax on innovation. See
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion (Boston Univ. School of Law,
Working Paper No. 05-18, 2005), availableat http://papers.ssrn.comlabstractid=831685. But it is not
clear how much help is provided by the Federal Circuit's move to constrain the DOE.
18. See Charles Oppenheim, Patent Information Usage in British Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (2000), available at http://scientific.thomson.com/knowtrend/ipmatters/btiU8199738 (reporting
that survey results revealing that 56.4% of small and medium sized British enterprises read patents, and
78% of these did so "[t]o check that a product does not infringe an existing patent"). Thus, 44% (44.0%
= 56.4% x 78%) of these finns read patents to avoid infringement. Admittedly, it is not clear that the
British experience matches the American experience. The best evidence on behavior in the United
States comes from Cohen, supra note 7, at 1-19, who find that 49.1% of U.S. respondents said patents
were a "moderately" or "very important" source of information on a rival's research and development.
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costs of increased refinement are borne by all applicants, but the benefit in
reduced notice cost derives from the relatively small fraction of patents that turn
out to have economic value. Quite true. Likewise, restriction of the DOE may
not increase refinement costs all that much because applicants understand that
any one patent is not so likely to be commercialized. We predict that empirical
research will some day show that the net social gains are higher when patents
provide better notice.

